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FDI flows to the Middle East and North Africa countries (MENA) have been relatively low 
when  compared  to  the  neighbouring  European  Union  (EU)  and  to  other  developing  and 
emerging countries. Furthermore, empirical research on FDI in these countries is relatively 
scarce. In this paper we use panel data regressions and consider a period of 9 years (since mid 
nineties) to investigate possible differences in the determinants of FDI performance in these 
regions. In particular, we use a panel of 42 countries which include 17 MENA countries and 
25 European countries. 
 
Unlike previous studies, we consider the inward FDI performance index, as provided by 
UNCTAD, as dependent variable and include both institutional and macroeconomic variables 
as possible determinants of FDI. The aim is to investigate whether there are region-specific 
factors that are significant for FDI performance. We conclude that there are some significant 
differences on the institutional determinants of FDI performance, namely in what concerns 
Investment Freedom, Government Size and Trade Freedom. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In the last decade the literature has been paying growing attention to the impact of   national 
institutions quality in economic development. In fact, institutional aspects as the protection of 
intellectual property rights, the regulation system, the degree of economic freedom and the 
level of corruption seem to be linked to countries’ economic prosperity. However, there has 
been some controversy about the direction of the causality between these aspects. In other 
words, do good institutions favour development or, on the contrary, do high development 
levels contribute to the emergence of good institutions? Although this question has not been 
definitively solved, recent work of Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu et. all. (2002) give 
robust evidence that it is the quality of the institutions that stimulates economic development 
and not the opposite. 
 
On the other hand, developing countries have been increasing their share in the total of world 
FDI flows, raising a growing interest in the study of FDI determinants in these countries. It 
has been recognized that FDI flows supply additional resources to the developing countries 
that can expand their economic performance, through technological progress, improvement in 
the factors productivity and incentives to national investment. 
 
Several studies have analysed the importance of institutional quality in FDI performance in 
developing countries, based on the understanding that good institutions should have a positive 
influence in the promotion of the investment and of FDI in particular. FDI represents a large 
share  of  capital  formation  in  poor  countries  (UNCTAD,  2004)  and  therefore  the  FDI-
promoting effect of good institutions might be an important channel to the overall economic 
growth and development.  
 
Two  facts  justify  this  relationship  between  institutions  and  FDI  attraction.  Firstly,  the 
presence  of  good  institutions  reduces  the  investment  transaction  costs,  turning  it  more 
profitable.  Secondly,  as  FDI  flows  involve  large  sunk  costs  (especially  in  the  case  of 
greenfield investment), investments become very sensitive to instability and insecurity, which 
are closely related to the effectiveness of the legal system and to the framework to enforce the   2 
property rights. Some studies have analyzed the influence of economic freedom in the FDI 
performance in developing countries, especially with regards to issues of the country's trade 
policy, its banking and finance services and its property rights protection (Globerman and 
Shapiro, 2003).  Likewise, Gwartney,  et. all. (2003) suggested that the  key ingredients to 
economic  freedom  include  freedom  to  invest  and  compete,  voluntary  exchange,  and 
protection of person and property. 
 
The new wave of  globalization has been changing the ways in which firms pursue their 
investment strategies, and altered the motives for investing abroad. Dunning (2002) sustains 
that FDI in developing countries shifted from market and resource-seeking investments, to 
more  efficiency-seeking  investments.  Some  authors  argue  that  the  relative  weight  of  the 
traditional market related factors (infrastructure, macroeconomic policy and wages) no longer 
hold, suggesting that less traditional determinants have become more important, as quality 
institutions and economic freedom (Becchetti and Hasan, 2004). 
 
In what concerns the MENA region
1, previous literature has emphasised that FDI flows have 
been relatively scarce, comparing to the European Union (EU) and to other developing and 
emerging countries (Hisarciklilar, et. all., 2006). Some features of the MENA countries could 
entail an important constraint for the inward FDI performance. In fact, this region is highly 
anchored on oil, which weakens the economic base, has a high population growth and high 
unemployment  rates,  displays  a  weak  regional  integration  and  the  capital  and  financial 
markets persist undeveloped. Moreover, despite the privatizations in the last years, the weight 
of the state in the economy is still high, and the literature stresses the lack of transparency and 
democracy, the underdevelopment of physical infrastructure and, in consequence, the low 
rates of return on human and physical capital. 
 
The  analysis  of  MENA  institutional  systems  appears  to  be  particularly  attractive  since  a 
significant  number  of  these  countries  have  been  experiencing  intense  economic  and 
institutional reforms. Furthermore, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership agreement, along the 
progressive elimination of trade barriers, has boosted trade relations and some countries have 
liberalized  investment  regulatory  framework,  creating  special  regimes  for  FDI.  Reforms 
include  tax  and  custom  duty  breaks,  lowering  ownership  limitations  and  implemented 
                                                 
1 Middle East and North Africa countries   3 
privatization and capital markets reform programs (UNCTAD, 2004). Taking into account 
these facts and the relatively sparse empirical research on FDI in MENA countries, we think 
that it is important to study this subject. 
 
In this paper we investigate the determinants of FDI performance in the MENA region, trying 
to capture the differences in relation to the EU countries, by using a sample of 42 countries, 
which include 17 MENA countries (a larger number than most of previous studies) and 25 of 
the present EU members
2. The aim is to investigate whether there are region-specific factors 
that are significant for FDI performance. Empirical studies on the determinants of FDI differ 
in  terms  of  the  variables,  methodologies  and  the  characteristics  of  FDI.  The  main 
determinants affecting the FDI flows can be classified into two categories, market-oriented 
factors and institutional-oriented factors. The effect of these variables on FDI flows changes 
over the time, according to the countries economic and institutional conditions. In this study 
our emphasis is in the institutional-oriented variables, although we also include economic 
related variables. 
 
This study uses a panel model covering a period of 9 years and considers, as indicators of the 
institutional efficiency, variables included in the Index of Economic Freedom provided by 
Heritage Foundation, which typically has not been used in previous research analysis on FDI 
in the MENA region. 
 
This paper differs from previous studies on FDI in the MENA region in other several aspects. 
First, it compares MENA countries with a neighbouring region  and specifically tests for 
significant differences on the effects of institutional variables.  Second, we use as dependent 
variable the inward FDI performance index, as provided by UNCTAD. The index measures 
FDI  performance  for  a  3  year  period  which  may  be  a  better  variable  to  measure  FDI 
attractiveness, given the usual high volatility of FDI flows. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the empirical literature linking 
institutions and FDI, emphasizing the research on the MENA countries. Section 3 presents 
the data used in the empirical study and examines some descriptive statistics on the economic 
                                                 
2 Belgium and Luxemburg are not considered due to data problems.   4 
and  institutional  variables  in  the  MENA  region  and  in  the  EU.  Section  4  presents  the 
econometric approach and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature overview 
 
The  literature  on  institutions  and  FDI  is  mainly  related  to  the  study  of  the  impact  of 
institutions quality on inward FDI flows. An early attempt to study this issue is Wheeler and 
Mody  (1992),  which  use  the  first  principal  component  of  13  risk  factors  (including 
bureaucracy, political instability, corruption and the legal system quality). However, they did 
not find a significant impact of ‘good’ institutions on the location of US foreign affiliates. A 
later study performed by Wei (2000) pointed out corruption as a significant impediment to 
inward FDI. Nevertheless, this result was challenged  by Stein and Daude (2001) who argued 
that high correlation between corruption and GDP per capita could lead to spurious results as 
GDP per capita was not included in the equation. Using a wider range of institution variables, 
they showed inward FDI to be significantly influenced by the quality of institutions. 
 
The links between FDI flows and political risk and institutions is also explored by Busse and 
Carsten  (2005)  using  a  sample  of  83  developing  countries  and  taking  into  account  12 
different indicators for the period 1984 to 2003. They found that the investment profile, 
internal and external conflicts, ethnic tensions and democratic accountability are significant 
determinants of FDI flows. Across different econometric models, the relative magnitude of 
the  coefficients  for  these  political  indicators  are  largest  for  government  stability  and 
law/order, suggesting that changes in these components are greatly relevant for investment 
decisions of multinationals. 
 
A recent study is provided by Dumludag et. all. (2007), who investigates the relationship 
between FDI flows and institutions in several emerging markets, employing a panel data 
approach from 1992 to 2004. The socio-political variables cover juridical system, corruption, 
investment profile, political stability and economic, social and political risks. They conlude 
that  institutional  variables  are  significant,  particularly  corruption,  investment  profile  and 
government stability. 
 
The impact of ‘institutional distance’ between the home country and the host country was 
recently scrutinised by Bénassy-Quéré et. all. (2007). They use databases provided by the   5 
French Ministry of Finance network and the Fraser Institute to study the role of institutions in 
the host and in the source country. They estimate a gravity equation for bilateral FDI stocks 
including governance indicators for both countries. The analysis provides robust evidence 
that  institutions  do  matter  independently  of  the  countries  development  level.  In  fact,  the 
results show that inward FDI is positively affected by public efficiency, which includes tax 
system,  transparency  and  lack  of  corruption,  property  rights  and  the  facility  to  create  a 
business. 
 
In sum, many empirical studies stress the relevance of institutional variables supporting the 
idea that an efficient legal and social framework reduces economic uncertainties. So, most of 
them sustain that the existence of clear and enforceable laws to ensure property rights, low 
corruption levels and macroeconomic and political stability influences  positively the  FDI 
flows and economic growth. In fact, if these conditions do not exist in host countries, foreign 
investors can face particularly high costs in establishing their investments. 
 
Studies on FDI determinants for the MENA countries are relatively scarce, in spite of some 
recent studies have analysed this issue by using different methodologies and data sets. They 
all  share  the  idea  that  FDI  for  these  countries  is  low,  comparing  with  other  developing 
countries and in particular to neighboring regions. In addition, most of them concentrate on 
the investigation of the importance of the institutional aspects for the FDI inflows in these 
countries,  concluding  that  institutions  are  important  to  explain  the  poor  performance  in 
MENA region to attract FDI flows. Yet, these studies have produced somewhat contradictory 
results,  as  the  same  determinants  are  found  to  be  significant  in  some  studies  and  not 
significant in others. 
 
One of the first studies is performed by Kamaly (2002), who uses a dynamic panel model 
covering  the  period  1990-1999.  In  this  study,  economic  growth  and  the  lagged  value  of 
FDI/GDP were identified as the only significant determinants of FDI flows to the MENA 
region. However, this approach, as in most other studies on FDI in developing countries, does 
not  cover  a  recent  period  and  uses  a  small  sample,  thus  raising  questions  about  the 
consistency  and  efficiency  of  the  coefficients  of  the  dynamic  model.  Also,  it  does  not 
consider the institutional factors that affect FDI flows to the MENA region. 
   6 
Chan  and  Gemayel  (2004)  examine  the  relationship  between  FDI  and  macroeconomic 
instability  in  the  MENA  region,  measuring  instability  with  the  standard  deviation  of  the 
economic, financial and political risk indexes from the International Country Risk Guide. 
They employ dynamic panel data models using two groups: one with 19 MENA countries 
and the other with 14 EU countries as well as Canada and USA for the period 1990-1999. 
Their results show that instability has a much stronger impact on FDI than risk itself, being 
this especially relevant for the MENA region. However, there are some questions about the 
consistency and the efficiency of the coefficients of the dynamic models. In particular, the 
estimation methods used do not take into account endogeneity problems. 
 
One other appraisal on the influence of quality of institutions on trade and FDI in MENA 
countries is developed by Méon and Sekkat (2004). Their sample includes data from 1990 to 
1999, covering a number of countries between 34 and 107, which include several MENA 
countries. They use some indicators to proxy the quality of institutions, namely in relation to 
corruption, political risk and governance and use both panel data and cross-sectional models. 
The results show a significant relationship between political risk and inward FDI, but failed 
to find clear evidence of a significant relationship between corruption and FDI flows. In fact, 
they employ different indicators of corruption and conclude that the results are sensitive to 
the index used to measure corruption. 
   
By using the Kaufmann, et. all. (2005) governance indicators, Daniele and Marani (2007) 
examine  the  role  of  the  quality  of  institutions  on  FDI.  They  perform  a  cross  sectional 
regression analysis using a sample of 129 countries, and an average of the FDI inflows for the 
period  1995-2004  and  conclude  that  institutions  are  essential  to  explain  the  relative 
performances  of  countries  in  attracting  FDI.  Subsequent  comparative  analysis  of  the 
institutions in 9 MENA countries and in other countries, allows them to conclude that the 
MENA region is a great handicap in this issue. 
 
Taking a different approach, Hisarciklilar, et all. (2006) examines the location drivers of FDI, 
with an emphasis on the role of market potential of the host country in attracting FDI. They 
cover  a  sample  of  18  countries  for  the  period  1980-2001  and  estimate  a  panel  model 
incorporating spatial autocorrelation in the disturbances. Their results suggest that foreign 
investment in the MENA region is horizontal in nature and is mainly market-oriented, aiming 
at to supply the domestic market and its neighbouring countries.   7 
 
Ferragina and Pastore (2006) study FDI flows from the EU to two neighbouring regions: 
Central and Eastern Europe and South Mediterranean countries, to examine if there was any 
diversion effect on FDI flows following the CEE integration in the EU. They use a gravity 
type model and a panel data approach to analyse the determinants of bilateral FDI flows of 
major investing countries for the period 1994-2004. Among the explanatory variables they 
include some institutional aspects like the existence of current and capital account restrictions 
and governance indicators, concluding that there is no evidence of FDI diversion, but the 
results highlight that governance is highly significant. 
 
Finally,  Onyeiwu  (2008)  uses  a  logit  and  cross-country  regressions,  for  61  countries,  to 
examine whether scarce investment in knowledge, technology, and human capital by MENA 
countries explains their sub-optimal FDI profile. Results from both models suggest that this 
kind of investment is not significant for the MENA country’s ability to attract an optimal 
level of FDI. On the contrary, openness of the economy, GDP per capita and political risks 
are more important to attract FDI flows. Hence, one implication for MENA countries is that, 
despite  their  poor  science  and  technology  infrastructure,  they  can  still  attract  FDI  by 
promoting openness and political rights and civil liberties. 
 
 
3.  Preliminary Analysis of the Data  
 
In this section we perform a description of the variables used in the study and analyse their 
evolution  along  the  period  considered.  We  use  a  panel  data  set  comprising  a  total  42 
countries, which include 17 MENA countries and 25 EU members. In what concerns the FDI 
data,  we  employ  the  inward  FDI  performance  index  for  the  period  1995/97-2003/05  as 
provided by UNCTAD, which ranks countries by the FDI inflows relatively to their economic 
size. The index assumes that, other things being equal, economic size is the ‘base line’ for 
attracting investment, and therefore differences in the index performance are consequence of 
factors other than market size. 
 
Figure 1 presents the evolution of the average FDI performance index for both regions along 
the period.  It is clear that the EU displayed a higher FDI attraction than the MENA region as 
well as a greater stability in the index average. Also, it shows a strengthening of the FDI   8 
attraction in these regions in recent years, especially in the MENA region. In fact, in this 
region  the  average  values  of  the  index  have  been  increasing  steadily  after  2000/2002, 
approaching the EU average. 
 





























Source: Own calculations, based on UNCTAD data 
 
 
This work aims at analysing the impact of several institutional variables on FDI performance 
besides the effect of economic variables, like GDP per capita, trade openness and population 
of the host country. Then, as indicators of the institutional efficiency, we consider some of 
the variables included in the Index of Economic Freedom. The index provides 10 different 




- Business Freedom is the ability to create, operate, and close firms quickly and easily. 
Naturally, when business freedom is higher there should be more incentive to invest, 
which means that a positive relationship with inward FDI performance is expected. 
- Trade Freedom is related to the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Its impact on 
FDI depends on the specific nature of the investment (Kojima, 1975).  If the aim is to 
supply domestic markets and overcome trade barriers then a greater trade freedom will 
                                                 
3 These variables detailed definition can be seen in appendix.   9 
tend to reduce FDI. On the other hand, if the viability of the investments is highly 
dependent on imported inputs, FDI will be boosted by more trade freedom. Empirical 
studies have provided evidence supporting both premises, so expect result is ambiguous. 
-  Government  size  is  measured  by  countries  government  expenditure.  Lower  levels  of 
expenditure represent a higher index value. When government expenditures become too 
high,  public  sector  competes  with  private  agents  in  investing,  therefore  generating 
crowding-out  effects  and  interfering  in  the  market  prices.  Consequently,  high 
government expenditures might discourage foreign investments.  
- Investment Freedom is an assessment of the free flow of capital in the country. The 
correlation between the investment freedom and FDI is intuitive.  In fact, in the absence 
of barriers, capital will flow to countries where productivity and the rate of return on 
investment will be higher. Firms tend to invest in economies that have less restrictive 
regulations on capital flows. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between the FDI 
performance index and this indicator. 
-  Property  rights  are  also  expected  to  be  positively  correlated  with  inward  FDI 
performance. In reality, legislation that provides a high level of security in terms of 
private property in countries implies a smaller risk for foreign firms when investing. 
  - Freedom from corruption has been suggested to affect positively FDI. Corruption might 
disturb  the  optimal  allocation  of  resources  in  any  economy,  because  it  introduces 
uncertainty  and  additional  costs  to  the  agents'  decisions.  So,  it  is  accepted  that  the 
foreign firms perception of corruption influences negatively their investment decisions. 
 
Some descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this work are presented in Tables 1 and 
2. Table 1 considers the whole period of analysis and in Table 2 we present the average and 
standard deviations for the variables splitting the sample in two periods
4.  Analysing GDP per 
capita we conclude that the EU displays an average of about 57% higher than the MENA 
countries, although this difference has been slowly decreasing between the 1st and the 2nd 
period (while the GDP has increased by 12,9% in the EU, in the MENA grew about 16,4%). 
The EU also presents an openness degree which is higher than the MENA’s and which has 
                                                 
4 We have considered two sub-periods (1995/97-1990/01 and 2000/02-2003/05) to capture the dynamics of the 
variables along the time. 
   10 
increased at a rate four times greater than in the MENA countries (18.5% in the EU and only 
3.9% in the MENA region). 
 
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics – 1995/1999 to 2003/2005 
  Total  MENA  EU 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
FDI Performance  1.66  1.58  1.03  1.47  2.044  2.65 
Population  20565.99  23673.92  22376.62  24828.61  19496.46  22956.56 
GDP per Capita  14779.29  8369.888  11018.54  9367.96  17000.75  6826.96 
Openness  92.62  43.13  88.04  44.44  95.33  42.21 
Business  71.62  10.87  70.47  12.67  72.30  9.62 
Trade  69.16  14.21  59.99  17.71  74.57  7.61 
Government  45.39  23.49  62.05  17.64  35.55  20.83 
Investment  61.70  16.32  52.20  19.23  67.30  11.03 
Property rights  63.10  20.18  53.46  19.53  68.79  18.35 
Corruption  54.13  24.34  45.64  24.71  59.14  22.73 
 
 
In what concerns Business freedom, the data reveals that the values of the EU and the MENA 
are very similar for the whole period. Nevertheless, there was a different evolution within the 
two periods: it remained stable for the EU but it decreased about 12.5% in MENA. 
 
The EU displays a more favourable position in terms of Trade freedom, but both regions have 
improved  their  performance,  particularly  in  the  case  of  the  EU.  Moreover,  the  standard 
deviation  has  decreased  considerably  in  the  EU  along  the  period,  which  suggests  some 
convergence  in  the  procedures  related  to  trade  liberalisation,  due  to  the  progressive 
adjustment of the new member states. 
 
As for Investment freedom and Property rights the EU presents also a better performance. 
Moreover, while the EU position was fairly stable, there was a decrease on these indicators 
for the MENA region, especially in what concerns Property Rights. This evolution for the 
MENA countries might indicate the existence of more obstacles to FDI.  
 
In relation to the Freedom from corruption index the situation is similar to the other two 
previous  indicators.  As  expected,  the  EU  average  is  higher  although  there  was  a  small 
improvement  in  the  MENA  indicator.  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  the  case  of  the 
Government size indicator the MENA region is in a better position than the EU (the average   11 
index  is  about  43%  higher  than  in  the  EU),  although  there  was  an  improvement  in  this 
indicator for the EU along the years. 
 
 




2000/2002-2003/2005    
   MENA  EU  MENA  EU 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
FDI Performance  0.91  1.67  1.88  1.74  1.16  1.24  2.24  1.74 
Population  22391.83  24405.86  19693.14  23029.63  22360.67  25463.76  19261.65  22985.11 
GDP per Capita   10199.70  8131.45  16053.82  6539.38  11876.99  10508.86  18131.27  7022.23 
Openness  86.40  47.07  87.92  41.11  89.75  41.82  104.17  42.00 
Business  75.08  12.23  72.56  9.91  65.65  11.33  71.99  9.30 
Trade  59.77  16.74  72.81  8.11  60.22  18.81  76.67  6.40 
Government   62.07  18.83  31.93  21.70  62.03  16.47  39.88  18.96 
Investment  53.08  20.38  67.26  9.43  51.29  18.06  67.35  12.73 
Property Rights  58.15  19.76  67.95  17.89  48.55  18.18  69.80  18.94 
Corruption  44.91  23.83  59.04  23.38  46.40  25.77  59.26  22.05 
 
 
Finally, we have to refer the existence of high dispersion in the variables (measured by the 
standard deviation) for both regions and in the two periods. This trend reveals the persistence 
of a high heterogeneity of economic performance and of the quality of institutions inside each 
group.  In  the  case  of  the  MENA  countries  very  different  realities  coexist.  In  fact,  some 
countries  have  made  special  efforts  to  become  investor-friendly  by  making  the  business 
environment more open and stepping up structural and institutional reforms while others have 
been pursuing different ways. As for the EU, the dispersion of the variables is related to the 
fact that along these years several new countries, displaying very different levels of economic 
and social development, have joined the EU
5. 
 
In sum, we conclude from the analysis that: 1) the two groups of countries reinforced the FDI 
attraction along the period, however, despite the convergence between both regions, the EU 
continues to display superior ability to attract new FDI flows in relation to the MENA region; 
                                                 
5 We have considered the current composition of the EU (27 members) and computed the average of the 
variables without taking into account the fact that along the period of analysis several countries have joined 
the EU. In effect, in the 1st sub-period the Union had only 15 members and during the second it started to 
have 25 and only recently Bulgaria and Romania become part of EU. Naturally, in some economic and 
institutional variables the proximity in the average values of the two groups (MENA and EU) reflects the fact 
that the countries that joined the EU display lower values than the oldest members, thus contributing to 
lowering the average values of this group.    12 
2)  in  what  concerns  the  economic  variables  both  groups  have  improved  their  economic 
performance, along with the underpinning of the trade openness degree; 3) the place and the 
recent dynamics of the institutional variables is clearly favourable to the EU, revealing the 
poor performance by the MENA countries in relation to the Property Rights, Investment 
Freedom, Trade Freedom and Freedom from corruption. 
 
4.  Empirical Approach and Analysis of Results 
 
 
We estimate a gravity-type model in order to identify the differences in the determinants of 
FDI between MENA countries and EU countries, in the period 1995 to 2005. Following most 
of the previous studies, we use panel data techniques to estimate the model. In fact, it is 
important to consider possible unobservable country effects which may be correlated with 
FDI  performance  and  that  can  not  be  taken  into  account  in  a  cross-sectional  approach.  
Therefore, our model is: 
 
                                 2 it it t i it Y X a β γ ε − = + + +                                           (1) 
 
where Yjt represents the logarithm of the index of FDI inward performance  and Xit-2 stands 
for the explanatory variables that are specific to each country. Given the fact that there is a 
lag on the investment decision, we consider a two year lag in the explanatory variables
6. 
 
We have introduced as explanatory variables the traditional gravity variables: the logarithm 
of GDP per capita (GDPcap) and the logarithm of the country population (population). It is 
expected  that  both  GDP  per  capita  and  population  will  have  a  positive  impact  in  FDI 
performance.  We also include the degree of openness of the host country, proxied by the 
logarithm of the ratio of external trade as a whole to GDP, which should be also positively 
correlated  with  FDI.  Several  variables  representing  institutional  issues  are  considered.  In 
particular, we include 6 indicators of economic freedom, which might be related to FDI: 
Trade, Investment, Corruption, Government Size, Property Rights and Business. 
Contrasting with previous studies, in order to test if there are significant differences in the 
effects of institutions between the two regions, we also introduce several interactions between 
a dummy variable MENA and each of the institutional variables (MENA equals one if the 
                                                 
6  The FDI performance index is measured for a three year period, so we use the value of the explanatory 
variables for the first year of this period.   13 
country belongs to the MENA region). We expect at least some of the institutional variables 
to  affect  significantly  FDI  performance.  Moreover,  it  is  expected  that  the  effect  of  the 
institutional variables will differ significantly between the two regions. Finally, a dummy 
variable to capture possible differences for the countries that joined the EU along the time 
period was also included (JEU).   
The error structure of the model comprises ai, which represents the unobservable fixed effect 
(which  model  time-invariant  country  specific  effects)  and  it ε   which  is  the  remainder 
stochastic disturbance term. The unobservable time effect is represents by  t γ , for taking into 
account possible business cycle effects. 
Taking a panel approach we have to consider the choice between a random-effects and a 
fixed-effects model. If the country specific fixed effects (ai) are correlated to the explanatory 
variables, a fixed-effects model should be adopted. The Hausman test can be used to check 
this correlation. In the present case the Hausman test rejected the hypothesis of no correlation 
between the common specific effects and the regressors, suggesting the use of a fixed-effects 
model. In addition, in all regressions we calculate heteroscedastic consistent standard errors 
in order to correct for heteroscedasticity problems. 
The model estimates are presented in Table 3.  We conclude that, as expected, both GDP per 
capita and degree of openness seem to be important to explain FDI performance. Therefore, 
this indicates that a higher purchasing power of potential consumers (proxied by the GDP per 
capita) and a higher degree of openness are strong stimulus to FDI flows in these countries.  
Also,  these  variables  seem  to  affect  both  regions  in  a  similar  way
7.  On  the  contrary, 
population displays the expected positive sign but it is not significant. 
As other previous studies, we conclude that some institutional issues are important to explain 
FDI performance. In our case, Trade freedom, Property Rights and Investment freedom seem 
to be correlated with FDI performance in the EU countries. However, all   display a negative 
effect on FDI performance which is not according to expected. 
                                                 
7 Tests on the difference of coefficients on these variables between MENA and EU reveal that they are not 
statistically different.    14 
      Table 3: Determinants of FDI  Performance 
                                          Fixed-effects model 
       
Variable 
Coefficient 
(Robust Std. Err.) 
GDPcap 
  2.55*    
(0.754) 
Population 
2.25    
(1.634) 
Open 






  -0.014* 
(0.005) 




































F Test (all coeff. =0)  6.57* 
                                Hausman  test  51.97* 
N  342 
    NOTES: Dependent variable is the logarithm of the FDI performance index.   
          Variables definition, countries used  in regression and data sources are displayed in appendix.  
           Time dummies were also introduced but are not reported. 
            (*), (**) and (***) denotes values significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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The reason why FDI performance in the EU countries seems to be negatively correlated with 
these variables may be greatly related with the performance of some new EU members in this 
period. In fact, some new member states present lower levels in these indicators and have 
been displaying a good FDI performance
8. We have to bear in mind that 10 of the current EU 
members have made a transition from centrally planned to market economies, initiating the 
adaptation of their institutions in the 90’s. Hence, it is normal that the indicators of economic 
freedom of these countries are smaller than the ones of the older members
9. 
 
In  the  case  of  Trade  freedom  a  negative  correlation  might  mean  that  trade  and  FDI  are 
substitutes, and therefore a higher trade liberalisation implies a reduction in FDI flows. In 
fact, higher trade protection should make firms more likely to substitute affiliate production 
for exports to avoid the costs of trade production. This phenomenon is commonly termed by 
tariff-jumping as referred by Bloningen (2002). 
 
We also conclude that there are significant differences between the MENA region and the EU 
in what concerns the effect of Trade Freedom, Government size and Investment Freedom. 
Contrary  to  the  EU,  higher  Investment  Freedom  positively  and  significantly  affects  FDI 
performance in the MENA countries. Government size presents a negative and significant 
effect in the case of the MENA region. In fact, we tested the significance of the variables to 
explain FDI performance in the MENA region, and conclude that both Investment Freedom 
and Government size have a significant influence in these countries
10. The negative sign of 
Government size means positive relation with level of government expenses, which suggests 
that public investment in infrastructures in these countries may have been important attractors 
for FDI flows. 
 
Also, property rights seem to be important, displaying a similar effect to what occurs in the 
EU. Furthermore, unlike the EU, the effect of trade Freedom is very small and it is not 
                                                 
8 Descriptive statistics for the EU-15 and for the new member states are presented in appendix. 
 
9 For example, the average values of corruption and property rights of the 12 new members are, respectively, 
about  78%  and  43%  lower.  Moreover,  foreign  investors  seem  to  have  followed  an  anticipation  strategy 
performing high investments in the future new members, which is apparent in the average FDI performance 
index for the new member states (about 48% higher than the one of the older members). 
 
10 Specifically,  we rejected the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients for each iteration and respective 
variable  equals  zero:  (MENA*variable+variable=0),  at  5%  significance  level  for  Government  size  and 
Investment Freedom and at 10% for property rights.   16 
significant.  All  the  other  institutional  aspects,  Business  Freedom  and  Freedom  from 
corruption, do not seem to affect differently both EU and MENA regions. 
 
Therefore, our results are in accordance with previous studies, which have concluded that the 
quality of institutions seem to be an important factor to explain the MENA performance in 
what FDI is concerned. In particular, our results show that there are significant differences in 
the effect of trade barriers, investment climate and of government size between this region 
and the neighbouring EU region.   
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
 
Historically the MENA region has been displaying low levels of FDI when compared with 
other regions. The reasons for this situation are not yet clearly determined.  This paper builds 
on previous research investigating the determinants of FDI in a sample of MENA and EU 
countries, considering some economic variables and other related to institutional issues. We 
analyse the significance of these variables for the all sample and test for differences between 
the two regions. 
 
The focus of this study is important as it seeks to improve knowledge of FDI dynamics in 
MENA and EU countries. Clearly, a better knowledge of the determinants of FDI is crucial 
for developing strategies to promote long-term economic development. The main conclusion 
is that the pure economic variables (GDP and Openness) display positive and significant 
effects on FDI performance and present similar effects in both regions. 
 
Furthermore, the institutional variables present different effects for the two regions, both with 
respect to the expected effect and significance. In particular, while some variables (Business 
Freedom  and  Corruption  Freedom)  do  not  seem  to  be  significant  for  both  groups  of 
countries,  others  display  very  different  effects,  especially  in  what  concerns  Investment 
Freedom and Government Size. It is therefore important to search for explanations for these 
results. 
 
In  what  concerns  the  MENA  countries,  we  emphasise  the  fact  that  Investment  Freedom 
presents a positive and significant correlation with FDI performance, which means that policy   17 
measures  taken  by  some  of  these  countries  in  order  to  effectively  reduce  barriers  to 
investment flows have stimulated FDI. On the other hand, there is a significant and negative 
relation to government size (or equivalently a positive relation with level of public expenses), 
which implies that the public investment effort in infrastructures in these countries may have 
been important to attract FDI.  
 
In the case of the EU, apparently it seems that some of the results are not according to 
expected. We believe that the evolution of the 12 new member states in the time period 
considered in the sample greatly contributes to this situation.  In fact, during the period of 
transition these countries have gone through important institutional and economic changes, in 
order to prepare themselves to join the EU. At the same time, these countries have attracted 
important FDI flows. 
 
Consequently, the disparity in the results of the institutional variables may be explained by 
two main facts. On the one hand, the two groups of countries display very different economic 
and  institutional  contexts,  along  with  high  heterogeneity  inside  each  group,  which  may 
influence  in  a  different  way  the  FDI  countries  attractiveness.  On  the  other  hand,  some 
ambiguities  in  issues  related  to  the  theoretical  and  methodological  reference  framework 
persist. 
 
Some  unexpected  outcomes  might  result  from  a  deficient  specification  of  the  variables 
contents as well as from the inexistence of a stable theoretical framework to explain the 
relationship between quality of institutions, economic freedom and the attractiveness of FDI. 
There is the need for new theoretical and empirical approaches that set the role of policy and 
institutions in the core of the economic analysis. 
  
Following these results, we believe that there are sufficient motives to further investigate 
these issues. In fact, most institutional determinants of FDI are fairly fragile statistically. 
Research  on  these  issues  is  still  at  an  early  stage  and  much  more  remains  to  be  done. 
Therefore, future research should test different indicators for institutions quality, with more 




A1. Variables Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable 
   
       Definition     
  Source 
FDI Performance    
   
It is the ratio of a country’s share in global FDI inflows to 









i e Performanc = . 
(FDIi is the FDI inflows in the i-th country, FDIw is the 
world FDI inflows, GDPi is the GDP in the i-th country 
and GDPw is the world GDP)  
A value greater than one thus indicates that the country 
receives more FDI than its relative economic size, a value 
below one that it receives less.    
 
  UNCTAD 
GDPcap                      real  Gross domestic product per capita in constant 
prices. In dollars.  
Penn World Table 
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/) 
 
Population   population of each country (in thousands)  Penn World Table 
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/) 
Openness  exports plus Imports divided by GDPcap , in constant 
prices 
 Penn World Table 
(http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/) 
 
Trade Freedom  is a composite measure of the absence of tariff and non-
tariff barriers that affect imports and exports of goods and 
services. 
Index of Economic 




is an assessment of the free flow of capital. This factor 
scrutinizes  each  country’s  policies  toward  foreign 
investment, as well as its policies toward capital flows 
internally,  in  order  to  determine  its  overall  investment 
climate. 
Index of Economic 
Freedom - Heritage 
Foundation * 
Government Size  is  defined  to  include  all  government  expenditures, 
including  consumption  and  transfers.  Ideally,  the  state 
will  provide  only  true  public  goods,  with  an  absolute 
minimum of expenditure. 
Index of Economic 




is the ability to create, operate, and close an enterprise 
quickly  and  easily.  Burdensome,  redundant  regulatory 
rules are the most harmful barriers to business freedom. 
Index of Economic 




is based on quantitative data that assess the perception of 
corruption in the business environment, including levels 
of  governmental  legal,  judicial,  and  administrative 
corruption. 
Index of Economic 
Freedom - Heritage 
Foundation * 
Property Rights  are  an  assessment  of  the  ability  of  individuals  to 
accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that 
are fully enforced by the state 
Index of Economic 
Freedom - Heritage 
Foundation * 
 
* Index of Economic Freedom: This index is provided by Heritage Foundation for 161 countries. To 
measure economic freedom and rate each country, 50 independent variables are considered. These 
variables fall into 10 categories of economic freedom. Each country receives its overall economic 
freedom score based on the simple average of the 10 individual factor score. Each factor is graded 
according to a unique scale. The scale runs from 0 to 100. A score of 100 indicates an economic 
environment or a set of policies that are most conducive to economic freedom; a score of 0 signifies a 
set of policies that are least conducive to economic freedom.  
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  A2. Variables Correlation 
               pop   gdpcap   open  business  trade  government investment property R. corruption 
    ------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
     pop  |  1.00 
   gdpcap | -0.25   1.00 
     open | -0.77   0.16    1.00 
 business | -0.20   0.39    0.25     1.00 
    trade | -0.13   0.67    0.09     0.33     1.00 
govermment| -0.01  -0.58    0.06    -0.17    -0.42     1.00 
property R| -0.01   0.65    0.11     0.58     0.54    -0.55      0.48      1.00  
corruption| -0.03   0.73   -0.01     0.47     0.50    -0.53      0.32      0.72      1.00 
   
 
A3. Countries in the Sample 
 
MENA  EU 
 Algeria 




 Lebanon  
 Morocco 
 Syrian Arab Republic 
 Tunisia 
 Turkey 




 Saudi Arabia 




               Austria  
               Bulgaria  
                 Cyprus  
          Czech Republic  
                Denmark  
                Estonia  
                Finland  
                 France  
                Germany  
                 Greece  
                Hungary  
                Ireland  
                  Italy  
                 Latvia  
              Lithuania  
                  Malta  
            Netherlands  
                 Poland  
               Portugal  
                Romania  
               Slovakia  
               Slovenia  
                  Spain  
                 Sweden  
        United Kingdom  
A4. Sample statistics 
Table A4.1 EU descriptive Statistics 
  New Member States  Old Member States 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
FDI Performance  2.426889  1.433187  1.636863  1.545102 
Business  69.70874  10.49802  74.86842  8.104968 
Trade  70.58058    9.153742  78.27719  2.534367 
Government   45.33981  17.37353  26.72105  19.98918 
Investment  64.75728  12.51232  69.82456  9.021357 
Property rights  56.01942  16.29025  80.70175  10.70268 
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